Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations: A New Approach to Legal Interpretation by Stephens, Dale
XIV
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Dale Stephens*
Introduction
We live in the postmodern era of warfare,1 where small-scale, intra-Stateconflict is increasingly becoming the norm. While the modern era con-
ceived of war and warfighting as a large-scale, inter-State conflict waged between
massed professional armies,2 the postmodern era perceives conflict as “war among
the people”3 where technological advantage, massive firepower and physical ma-
neuver can count for little in the struggle for ascendancy.4 It turns out that such
conflict can be as deadly and as strategically significant as conventional warfare.
The US military in its recent reconceptualization of how such wars are to be ef-
fectively engaged (and how victory is to be meaningfully measured) has embraced
the realities of the emergent postmodern style of warfare. The recently published
U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual5 and its companion vol-
ume, The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual,6 portray a somewhat
counterintuitive model for prevailing in these postmodern conflicts. Significantly,
the methodologies these manuals espouse are written against the background of
bitter experience of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, partially through ne-
cessity, these doctrines emerged from reflection about these conflicts and took
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account of “counterinsurgency best practice.”7 The tactics and doctrine reflected
in these manuals worked to stave off near defeat, especially in the Iraq theater of
operations during the 2007 “surge.”8
Paradoxically, while military doctrine has managed a self-conscious leap in per-
spective regarding means and methods of warfare, there has been a correlative lack
of innovation within established mainstream legal thinking, at least in the prevail-
ing literature.9 A formalist methodology of interpretation and a continued com-
mitment to the attritional focus of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) remain the
prevalent orthodoxy, notwithstanding that such binary thinking has proven to
have had limited utility within counterinsurgency (COIN) and stabilization opera-
tions. There is plainly a need for renewed thinking, or at least an appreciation of the
direction warfare is going, so that interpretative techniques employed in LOAC
may be reimagined and recalibrated in order to remain relevant to operational
realities. This paper seeks to facilitate that process.
Part I of the paper will survey the themes contained in the counterinsurgency/
stability operations manuals and will contrast these to the prevailing intellectual
framework which underpins LOAC. Part II examines the key principles of “dis-
tinction” and “proportionality” under LOAC and argues that a reconceptualized
interpretative approach to implementing these principles is required. A particular
emphasis will be placed on the rules/standards dichotomy in order to better reveal
the limits of formalist thinking. Finally, Part III will canvass the challenges and
choices available to an operational legal advisor when operating during COIN/
stability operations consistently with revised doctrine.
Part I. COIN and Stability Operations: A New Doctrinal Paradigm
Counterinsurgency Doctrine
The strategic-political realities of the Cold War prompted preparation for large-
scale, inter-State “industrial” warfare.10 Technology, firepower and maneuver
were key elements in designing effective and efficient combat for massed profes-
sional armies. Rationalist strategizing provided the necessary gestalt and the “tools
of modernity”11 were expected to deliver operational success. According to Lieu-
tenant General Sir John Kiszely, it was a model that relied upon “more advanced
technology, firepower, lethality, speed, stealth, digitization, logistics, network-
centric warfare [and] hi-tech ‘shock and awe.’”12 These features still underpin the
requirements of fighting conventional warfare. Indeed, conventional warfare still
occurs, but is not the likely anticipated scenario for future warfighting.
The reality of postmodern warfare is what has been occurring in “post-conflict”
Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years. Such conflicts are mostly non-international
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in character and are typically manifested as small internecine warfare where non-
State actors employ asymmetric means against State military forces. The envi-
ronment in which this warfare is undertaken is one of mixed peace and war. The
deployment of armed State forces within such conflicts has been difficult to recon-
cile with “first order” conventional warfare training and preparation. Such conflict
has been variously described as, inter alia, “military operations other than war”
(MOOTW), peacekeeping, peace enforcement, “wider peacekeeping,” low intensity
conflict and “gray area operations.”13 These terms are not interchangeable, as they
differ according to legal and doctrinal authority and the nature of the deployment,
but they all share common elements which separate them from conceptions of
conventional warfare. These operations have required different and more nuanced
skills, though it was thought that conventional warfare training could be “ratcheted
down” to apply to such operations.14 Such assumptions were not well placed.
The US COIN Manual grapples with the new realities of postmodern war and
recommends decisive change. Indeed, the introduction to the manual makes it
very clear that it is intended to be “paradigm shattering.”15 Within the first para-
graph of the introduction, the point is forcefully made that “[t]hose who fail to see
the manual as radical probably don’t understand it, or at least understand what it’s
up against.”16 The manual provides that while all insurgencies are sui generis, there
are common characteristics that apply to all and there are patterns of operational
response that have been proven to be effective. The manual evidently borrows from
classic counterinsurgency works relating to the British experience in Malaya17 and
the French experience in Algeria,18 and it also updates the work that had been un-
dertaken during the Vietnam conflict.19 Most significantly, it draws upon contem-
porary experience in Iraq and Afghanistan in detailing a number of principles
labeled “paradoxes of counterinsurgency operations”20 that provide a conceptual
framework for operational planning.
In very clear terms the manual outlines the elements of an insurgency and iden-
tifies the requirements that must be met in order to prevail. The doctrine is con-
frontational and counterintuitive to that which is required for conventional
warfare. The manual painstakingly describes that an insurgency is fundamentally a
political struggle, where the center of gravity is the population, which remains “the
deciding factor in the struggle.”21 It is asserted that insurgents invariably use unlaw-
ful means to intimidate the population and discredit the legitimate government.
Such unlawful means are designed to bring about an overreaction by counterinsur-
gent forces. Violence is the currency of an insurgency and destabilizing the legiti-
macy of the host-nation government and its supporting counterinsurgent forces a
strategic goal.22 Provoking violation of counterinsurgent ethics and values in react-
ing to an insurgency is a means to secure that goal. This perspective is highlighted
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by counterinsurgent specialist David Kilcullen when describing the operational
modus operandi of Al Qaida in Iraq as one that relies upon provocation, intimida-
tion, protraction and exhaustion, and drawing the majority of its strength from the
“backlash engendered by counter-insurgent overreaction rather than genuine
popular support.”23 The COIN Manual describes that “[t]he real battle is for civil-
ian support for, or acquiescence to, the counterinsurgents and host nation govern-
ment. The population waits to be convinced. Who will help them more, hurt them
less, stay the longest, earn their trust?”24 Thus the primary purpose of a counterin-
surgency is “securing the civilian, rather than destroying the enemy.”25
In countering an insurgency, traditional thinking regarding combat and the
application of overwhelming force acts as a negative factor. “Cartesian or
reductionist”26 logic that is so ingrained in military staff training as the primary
means for problem solving offers little assistance. The temptation to act, “to do
something,”27 is likely the wrong response; rather, the better solution in a tactical
sense may be to exercise patience, “to do nothing.”28 Such an approach is chal-
lenging to the military ethos; Sir John Kiszely notes that counterinsurgency “re-
quires . . . warriors to acquire some decidedly un-warrior-like attributes, such as
emotional intelligence, empathy with one’s opponents, tolerance, patience, sub-
tlety, sophistication, nuance and political adroitness.”29 The battle is not con-
ceived in the ordinary “formulaic and mechanistic”30 sense but rather is more
conceptual, relying heavily upon sociological and psychological inputs. Kiszely
reinforces the need to work smarter rather than harder when conceptualizing the
counterinsurgency strategy, noting in tandem with the COIN Manual that de-
priving the insurgents of popular support and winning it oneself is the key
objective:
[T]he contest takes place not on a field of battle, but in a complex civilian environment
. . . . Nor is it a primarily military contest . . . . The war, is in large part a war of ideas, the
battle largely one for perception, and the key battleground is in the mind—the minds
of the indigenous population, and the minds of regional and world opinion.31
Kiszely approvingly cites classic counterinsurgency expert David Galula’s estima-
tion of effort in battling an insurgency as “twenty percent military, eighty percent
political [as] a formula that reflects the truth.”32 The psychological imperatives are
reiterated in General Rupert Smith’s analysis in The Utility of Force when he ob-
serves that “[w]ar amongst the people is different: it is the reality in which the peo-
ple in the streets and houses and fields—all the people, anywhere—are the
battlefield.”33 Kilcullen notes more pragmatically that “[i]n [a] population-centric
strategy, what matters is providing security and order for the population, rather
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than directly targeting the enemy—though this type of strategy will also effectively
marginalize them.”34
The implications of the revised COIN doctrine are far-reaching. The manual
lists a number of contemporary counterinsurgency imperatives that should guide
planning and execution.35 These principles have been replicated in operational
guidelines within Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I) protocols36 and have, in
fact, become operationalized over the past few years. Their import is significant
with respect to both military ethos and public expectation, and, as will be demon-
strated infra, also with respect to classic legal reasoning under LOAC. The princi-
ples of legal relevance recognized within the manual include the following
contemporary “paradoxes”:
• “Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be,”37
• “Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot,”38
• “Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is,”39 and
• “The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used
and the more risk must be accepted.”40
It is evident that COIN doctrine does knowingly place greater physical risk on
counterinsurgent forces. It concedes that choices will need to be made that will re-
sult in higher counterinsurgent casualties. These truisms necessarily test resolve,41
as well as public expectation. The questions of insurgent targeting and the formu-
lation of collateral/incidental damage/injury assessments in this new intellectual
environment play a pivotal part of the COIN strategy. Significantly, they do so in a
manner that reverses expectations and conventional reasoning. As will be dis-
cussed infra, a revised interpretative lens must be applied when grappling with
these legal tests. Such analysis reconfigures the current self-contained ethical
certainties currently underpinning traditional LOAC reasoning.
Stability Operations
Stability operations are incorporated into modern COIN42 and form part of the so-
called “full-spectrum operations” operational design. COIN and stability opera-
tions are likely to be conducted conjointly but emphasize different aspects of the
continuum. Stability operations doctrine shares the COIN aversion to kinetic op-
erations though it is more dedicated to broader capacity building.43 Stability opera-
tions are defined within US joint doctrine as follows:
[Stability operations encompass] various military missions, tasks, and activities
conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of
national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide
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essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and
humanitarian relief.44
Despite the overwhelming emphasis previously placed upon conventional war-
fare preparation, the Stability Operations Manual notes that the US military has, in
fact, only been involved in eleven conventional conflicts during its entire history.45
Conversely it has been involved in hundreds of operations that may be identified as
stability operations. Significantly, since the fall of the Berlin Wall alone, the manual
notes that US forces have been involved in fifteen stability operations.46 The Stabil-
ity Operations Manual represents a decisive “moment” where such operations are
squarely addressed and where doctrine is both tailor-made and comprehensive.
Stability operations are principally concerned with post-conflict operations.
The (in)famous phase IV element of the Operation Iraqi Freedom campaign plan,
for example, was not accorded a particularly high priority during the planning and
execution phases of the Iraqi conflict,47 and yet was supposed to deal with stabiliza-
tion. The failure to implement a comprehensive stabilization policy self-evidently
represented a significant strategic failure. As a result of that experience, and the
recalibration of enlightened doctrinal thinking, stability operations have been for-
mally accorded a high priority within the planning framework. US Department of
Defense Directive 3000.05 stipulates that
Stability Operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense
shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to
combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all [Department
of Defense] activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises,
material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.48
Stability operations are predicated upon the strategic proposition that in the
contemporary environment, US security is threatened more by weak and failing
States, which can act as sanctuaries for multinational terrorist networks, than by
traditional strong nation-State entities.49 The institutional design that underpins
stability operations is the creation in a post-conflict State of an environment that
facilitates reconciliation; establishes the development of political, legal, social and
economic institutions; and facilitates transition to a legitimate civil authority oper-
ating under the rule of law.50 It does deal with capacity building (indeed, embrac-
ing the previously maligned notion of “nation building”) and procedurally adopts
an interagency focus.51 Doctrinally, the US military’s role in stability operations is
to assist the US Department of State, which is to lead in these efforts,52 but also
principally to provide the necessary security to permit these conditions to
manifest.
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The stability operations doctrine has, not surprisingly, been dismissed as uto-
pian in design.53 The doctrine’s precepts of providing “basic public services, physi-
cal reconstruction, the hope of economic development and social amelioration”54
have been criticized by commentators such as Edward Luttwak, who query
whether models of Western liberal democracy (and the efforts required to create
such societies) are really the only political structures that will provide sufficient sta-
bility for US security interests.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, stability operations doctrine and the integral
capacity-building elements have been strongly identified by counterinsurgency ex-
perts as being a critical factor in effectively combating an insurgency. In describing
the factors that contributed to the success of the 2007 Iraq “surge,” for example,
Kilcullen notes, “[W]e conducted operations to support the rule of law, which
helped deal with ‘accelerants,’ and we introduced what we might call ‘decelerants’
such as political reconciliation and building competent, nonsectarian governance
and national institutions, which helped slow and reduce the intensity of the vio-
lence.”55 Indeed, Kilcullen criticizes the prevalent thinking that underpinned the
original Operation Iraqi Freedom planning for failing to anticipate the military le-
verage required to facilitate Iraqi governmental capacity to ameliorate sectarian
tendencies: “[B]ecause our focus was on transition rather than stabilization, on
getting ourselves out no matter what the situation was on the ground, we lacked
the presence or relevance to generate that leverage.”56
Like the COIN doctrine, the Stability Operations Manual implicitly acknowl-
edges that there is a finite limit in the ability of military force to achieve societal
outcomes. It has become a necessary feature of postmodern conflict today that
such recognition of the limitations of force is indispensible to strategic success.
These lessons are learned over and over and yet have been demonstrated to
achieve success in the context of multiple UN peace operations where stability-
type functions have formed a core element of Security Council peace-keeping/
peace-enforcement mandates.57
There remains considerable debate on the meaning of “rule of law” within the ac-
ademic literature and how it may be measured. Some perceive it as the external indi-
cia of a functioning legal system—that is, the establishment of police forces and
stations, courthouses and prisons—namely an institutionalist perspective,58 whereas
other more substantively based conceptions equate rule of law success to the acqui-
sition of internal values within the society and especially the power elites.59 This
too may draw the critique of imperialism, especially in its emphasis upon interna-
tional human rights (HR) standards being externally imposed upon a prevailing
culture.60 Notwithstanding these critiques, the implementation of a rule of law
program is seen, under stability operations doctrine, as a fundamental feature in
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building host-State legitimacy,61 though as will be subsequently addressed, it is not
without its own operationally significant difficulties.
Part II. The Law of Armed Conflict: Interpretative Paradigms in
COIN/Stability Operations
The law of armed conflict reflects an amorphous panoply of historical influences.
Sovereignty is represented in its preeminent, as well as disaggregated, forms, as are
the humanitarian impulses that act as a counterbalance to sovereign military
rights. In form, it displays a jumble of sharp distinctions, positivist freedom, hu-
manitarian obligations and, of course, the perennial interpretative interplay be-
tween rules and standards.
The interdependence of rules and standards and between law and policy forms
the foundational structure and the basic intellectual framework for tackling the
paradoxes of restraint and freedom under the law. In discerning the correct inter-
pretative valence of the law of armed conflict either in conventional warfare or un-
der the more attenuated circumstances of COIN/stability operations, it is
especially critical to investigate the well rehearsed “dialectic”62 reasoning that is
employed when reconciling the advantages and disadvantages of employing rules
and standards and their respective modalities.
The purpose of this Part, therefore, is to survey interpretative techniques under
the framework of the rules/standards dichotomy as applicable to the law of armed
conflict. As the previous Part has demonstrated, there is a decisive shift in
reimagining the way the law should be applied in COIN/stability operations in or-
der to achieve definitive military goals. Rules necessarily carry with them a level of
rigidity that potentially resists incorporation of “policy,” whereas standards have
always been open to a more intuitive application of socio-legal norms. In the COIN
environment these traditional approaches have been upended somewhat, especially
in relation to the LOAC concepts of distinction (a rule) and proportionality (a
standard). This author will argue that in shaking these prima facie perspectives, the
COIN doctrine has created a fissure that reveals the limits of the traditional certain-
ties concerning interpretative valence. Simultaneously, however, we get an ex-
tremely insightful glimpse into the policy/legal interplay that underpins all
international law and which offers a unique opportunity for a more normatively
based and savvy approach to interpretation.
Rules and Standards
In his seminal article “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication”63 Duncan
Kennedy provides an illuminating account of the jurisprudence of rules and
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standards. Kennedy notes that such jurisprudence is “premised on the notion that
the choice between standards and rules of different degrees of generality is signifi-
cant, and can be analyzed in isolation from the substantive issues that the rules or
standards respond to.”64 Dealing first with rules, Kennedy identifies particularly
the dimension of “formal realizability,”65 which acts to give rules their “ruleness.”66
Hence a rule may be construed as a directive that is issued in language that directs
action in a determinate way to test factually distinguishable situations.67 Standards,
on the other hand, are more fluid and refer to directives that relate directly to one
of the substantive objectives of the legal order. Kennedy notes that examples of
standards are found in principles of “good faith,” “due care,” “fairness,” etc.68
Thus, when dealing with a standard, a judge is required to “both discover the facts
of a particular situation and to assess them in terms of purpose or social values em-
bodied in the standard.”69 This process is plainly a more freewheeling exercise
where underpinning values intentionally play a bigger role in the ex post reasoning
that is required under this regime. It also allows for a more instrumental applica-
tion of the law.
Pierre Schlag offers a similar, if more fused, explanation, identifying both rules
and standards as directives comprised of two parts, namely a “trigger” and a “re-
sponse.”70 The “trigger” may be empirical or evaluative.71 A rule paradigmatically
comprises a hard empirical trigger and a hard determinate response; hence he of-
fers that a rule may be stated as follows: “sounds above 70 decibels shall be pun-
ished by a ten dollar fine.”72 In contrast, Schlag defines standards as having a soft
evaluative trigger and a soft modulated response, identifying an example of a stan-
dard as “excessive loudness shall be enjoinable upon a showing of irreparable
harm.”73 Rules and standards may both be general or particular, may be condi-
tional or absolute, narrow or broad, weak or strong.74 Rules are thought to be more
costly in terms of their development with legislators or courts, employing greater
work in anticipating future variables they wish covered, and are perceived to be less
cost intensive in their application. Standards, on the other hand, offer a reverse
cost/benefit symmetry, being less costly to develop and more costly to apply in each
instance, requiring greater analysis and appreciation of both particular and sur-
rounding circumstances.75
The acknowledged benefits of rules are that they encourage certainty and guard
against official arbitrariness.76 Individuals may thus plan their affairs more confi-
dently knowing the boundaries of permissible and forbidden conduct. This may,
however, permit “close sailing” to social limits by canny individuals who are able to
more precisely order their activities to follow, but not exceed, strict limits.77 This
may, in turn, foster more socially suspect behavior as a “fixed cost” of doing busi-
ness.78 Standards, on the other hand, require individualized judgments about
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substantive compliance/violation that permit endorsed policy considerations to
play a significant role in the balancing that invariably takes place.79 Conversely, the
ambiguity about where the limits may lie within a standard can have a “chilling ef-
fect” upon individuals, who may desist from socially useful or desirable activities
because of self-imposed margins of appreciation to assumed limits.80 Standards
lack the certainty of rules and determinations having little precedential value are
usually the result.
Because rules can also be general, judges (and other decisionmakers) may end
up providing ad hoc exceptions and variations to their interpretations that act over
time to seriously undermine the certainties anticipated.81 There may be other rules
that are more particular in character and which act to contradict general rules, or at
least carve out specific areas of independent operation. Indeed, the historic positiv-
ist/realist debate revolves around the very choices permitted when interpreting
rules. H.L.A. Hart’s “soft positivism,” for example, anticipates a broad settled
“core” of meaning in the interpretation of rules and a smaller “penumbra” of de-
batable meaning.82 Legal realists find Hart’s assertions to be somewhat overstated,
at least in the context of appeal cases, and, while equally relying upon the positivist
frame of rules as having determinative effect, find greater discretion within legal
culture when applying particularized canons of interpretation to reach socially
cognizable outcomes.83
The Law of Armed Conflict Interpretative Structure
Evidencing its evolutionary historical development, the modern law of armed
conflict displays ample evidence of both hard empirical rules and more fluid
evaluative standards within its structure. These were products of different histori-
cal attitudes toward questions of sovereignty and more recently reflect questions
of legitimacy.84 Given the historical longevity of this body of law, fulsome positive
freedoms are invariably argued in favor of military discretion and the prevailing
treaty rules, especially those from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
tend to accommodate such advocacy. It needs to be recalled that a great propor-
tion of the modern law of armed conflict was fashioned at a time when interna-
tional jurisprudence was reluctant to presume limitations upon sovereignty.85
Against this backdrop it is not altogether surprising that humanitarian advocates
modified their strategy in the post–World War Two environment to introduce a
new narrative to the substance of the law. The incorporation of standards into the
LOAC lexicon was anticipated to better achieve humanitarian outcomes within
orthodox interpretative attitudes.86 Moreover it seemed to permit greater partner-
ship with military voices in exercising statecraft.87
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Mainstream LOAC literature tends toward a classic “soft positivism” in its in-
terpretative valence. Language is parsed carefully and the pedigree of legal norms
assessed very carefully.88 It has largely been a “closed system” of interpretative anal-
ysis, where there are exclusive relationships between legal ideas89 and where lan-
guage and its syllogistic interpellation play a key role in divining legal meaning.
Under this theory, legal practitioners and judges alike are able to skillfully employ
these interpretative techniques to arrive at the “correct” legal answer in each case.
Of course, it axiomatically reflects the “Hartian” themes of interpretation. It is this
author’s contention that such a methodological view has its unacknowledged limi-
tations especially in the context of COIN/stability operations. This article examines
the key LOAC principles of distinction and proportionality under the aegis of the
new doctrinal orientation applicable to postmodern warfare and will make a case
for acknowledging a revised measure of interpretative approach.
The Principle of Distinction
The principle of distinction has been described as a “cardinal” principle of the law
of armed conflict by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).90 Indeed, the principle as
reflected in Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (GPI) 91 is titled
the “Basic Rule” in Article 48, which states:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.
Violation of Article 48 is deemed a “grave breach” by virtue of Article 85(3)(a)
of GPI,92 and under Article 85(5) is further defined as a “war crime”93 that “High
Contracting” parties have a duty to repress and for which they have a duty to ensure
appropriate penal and disciplinary consequences are imposed. These obligations
extend to both subordinates and superiors who come within the ambit of com-
mand responsibility.94 Given the central place of the principle of distinction in the
LOAC firmament, it is not surprising that it has been accorded such stature.
The terms of Article 48 appear clearly to be a “rule.” Invoking Kennedy’s criteria,
it is clear that there is a high degree of formal realizability in its terms. A distinction
“at all times” is to be made between “combatants” and the “civilian population,” as
well as “military objectives” and “civilian objects,” and parties are obliged to “di-
rect operations only against military objectives” and, by implication, “combat-
ants.” The directive plainly contains the hard empirical trigger and hard
determinative response. Combatants and military objectives only may be attacked
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and civilians and civilian objects may not. Violation of this “Basic Rule” is deemed
both a “grave breach” and a “war crime.”
As with all generally stated directives, this rule is both under- and over-
inclusive.95 The operation of other provisions within GPI96 (as well as Additional
Protocol II (GPII) for non-international armed conflict 97) make an exception for
the rule against attacking civilians in the case of those civilians who take a “direct
part” in hostilities, for “such time as they take a direct part.”98 International dia-
logue on the issue of direct participation in hostilities (DPH) has, over recent years,
mapped out a series of functional categories for those civilians who may lose their
immunity.99 The consensus view would seem to be that DPH extends down the
causal chain from primary “shooter” or “bomb layer” to include (among others) ci-
vilian planners and tactical facilitators, at least in relation to organized armed groups
whose members assume a “continuous combat function” in non-international
armed conflict.100 Such expansion exceeds what the original drafters of the GPI
seemed to anticipate,101 though the expansion does reflect emergent operational
realities and associated State practice. Current perspectives have nonetheless set
what appear to be policy limits on the breadth of the loss of immunity (despite the
logic of “continuous combat function” extending down the causal chain). Hence
financiers and those inciting such participation through propaganda are not con-
sidered to come within the DPH rubric,102 notwithstanding that such activity has
great strategic and operational significance on sustaining a conflict, especially in an
insurgency.103 Thus, by virtue of a combination of legal construction and the arti-
fice of applied policy, certain civilians lose their immunity and others don’t under
the DPH formula. Some determinations are based upon a logical deduction from
what “direct participation” connotes, and others are based upon policy reasons
which seek to exclude those who might otherwise be caught by logically assessing
their functional impacts in inciting or sustaining an insurgency.104 These catego-
ries have been relatively clearly defined and articulated, and have been subject to
close superior court scrutiny in at least one domestic legal system.105 They may also
be reasonably appreciated in any “kill-capture” targeting methodology undertaken
by an opposing military force. It is, to paraphrase Kennedy, a relatively classic appli-
cation of a list of distinguishable factual criteria that allows intervention in a deter-
minate way. One is able to compile a “list” from a review of authoritative legal
materials and can verify via this list whether an individual’s function puts him/her
inside or outside the veil of immunity.
Accordingly, there appears to have been the development of a rule that, while
still relatively general, permits a confident appreciation of boundary. Military ac-
tion based upon this directive may be executed to the limits tolerated by the law
and, of course, canny military/legal planning may indeed permit “close sailing”
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while still purchasing the “moral absolutism” that “complying with the law”
provides.
While providing a firm lawful basis for the conduct of “kill-capture” operations,
the law itself is predicated upon a different theoretical model from that which ap-
plies in the context of COIN/stability operations. Accordingly, as a template for
military action its assumptions may lack the necessary operational acuity for
postmodern success. The primary corpus of modern LOAC was developed in the
immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The law, as comprised in the four
1949 Geneva Conventions, complemented the pre-existing Hague Law, which
dealt mostly with “means and methods.” This collective body of law anticipated
State-on-State “industrial” warfare106 to be the prototypical norm, where attrition
is the primary means by which to defeat military adversaries. The subsequent Viet-
nam conflict provided significant impetus to the development of the 1977 Addi-
tional Protocols that acted to partially fuse Geneva and Hague law with a more
contemporary relevance. Nonetheless, there was still a significant emphasis placed
upon a linear conception of warfare between sovereign equals and the model for
military triumph was still most assuredly one of attrition. Admittedly, GPI ex-
pressly recognizes particular non-State fighters participating in conflicts relating
specifically to colonial and alien domination and against racist regimes in their ex-
ercise of self-determination.107 However, they were not treated in any original
manner; rather such fighters were “elevated” in status akin to that of soldiers
within State forces. Similarly, while non-international conflicts were specifically
dealt with under GPII, the preeminent model was one that anticipated organized
dissident armed forces controlling territory and exercising State-like powers with
respect to that territory in order to implement the Protocol, as well as exercising
“responsible command” over such forces in order to conduct “sustained and con-
certed military operations.”108
The framework for engaging in conflict during COIN/stability operations es-
chews these norms. The strategies and tactics for COIN/stability operations are
profoundly more nuanced than what the law provides. The COIN doctrine coun-
sels greater restraint when confronting and targeting individuals who come
squarely within the criteria of DPH targeting. It has become clear that functional
categorization of individuals and the validity of the norm are not the complete an-
swer for lawful targeting—just as it has become clear that a state cannot kill its way
out of an insurgency. The success of the Iraqi surge in 2007 was dependent on an
extremely nuanced and politically aware strategy of engagement, where efforts
were made to reconcile with those who were otherwise targetable under the DPH
formula. The COIN guidance applicable to MNF-I makes it clear that discretion is
to be carefully exercised with respect to the application of force. Non-kinetic
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options have a decisive strategic role; hence under the point titled “Promote recon-
ciliation” the MNF-I guidance notes:
We cannot kill our way out of this endeavor. We and our Iraqi partners must identify
and separate the “reconcilables” from the “irreconcilables” through engagement,
population control measures, information operations, kinetic operations, and political
activities. We must strive to make reconcilables a part of the solution, even as we
identify, pursue, and kill, capture, or drive out the irreconcilables.109
The guidance for who may be “reconcilable” within the policy is not defined
with any great clarity. The criteria nonetheless require greater consideration of in-
dividual identity and broader sociopolitical considerations relating to the individ-
ual and the sectarian/tribal/regional connections he/she may be entwined within.
Kilcullen identifies such potentially “reconcilable” persons as “accidental gueril-
las,”110 individuals who find themselves manipulated into insurgent activity but
without the hard-core ideological drive. “Reconcilables” are also plainly those per-
sons who may be turned against their terrorist sponsors and who may offer both
intelligence and cooperation with the counterinsurgency effort. The turning of the
“Sons of Iraq,” predominantly within Al Anbar province during the surge, for ex-
ample, has been identified as a key outcome in addressing the insurgency.111
When the objective of a successful COIN/stability operation campaign is to
“win the population,” rather than “kill-capture” the insurgents,112 a different ori-
entation to legal interpretation is required. In reflecting on his experiences in Iraq,
former MNF-I Commander General David Petraeus acknowledged that when en-
gaged in COIN a sophisticated risk/benefit calculation is mandated when dealing
with the consequences of targeting. He implicitly acknowledges that such an analy-
sis may transcend traditional LOAC thinking in terms of determining who may be
targeted when he notes:
[W]e should analyze costs and benefits of operations before each operation . . . [by
answering] a question we developed over time and used to ask before the conduct of
operations: “Will this operation,” we asked, “take more bad guys off the street than it
creates by the way it is conducted?” If the answer to that question was, “No,” then we
took a very hard look at the operation before proceeding.113
In reinforcing this point, General Petraeus refers to lessons learned by previous
US commanders, commenting that
[i]n 1986, General John Galvin, then Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern
Command (which was supporting the counterinsurgency effort in El Salvador),
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described the challenge captured in this observation very effectively: “The . . . burden
on the military institution is large. Not only must it subdue an armed adversary while
attempting to provide security to the civilian population, it must also avoid furthering
the insurgents’ cause. If, for example, the military’s actions in killing 50 guerrillas cause
200 previously uncommitted citizens to join the insurgent cause, the use of force will
have been counterproductive.”114
The law of armed conflict doesn’t deal well with these questions. With respect to
the principle of distinction, it requires consideration of whether the person is
targetable, not whether the person should in fact be targeted and what such targeting
will do in the broader strategic environment. How do we rationalize this? It may be
that formalist conceptions of legal interpretation under LOAC are not indicted un-
der this new doctrinal focus and the principle of distinction may still retain its bi-
nary certainty. One might regard considerations of individual “reconcilability”
and cost/benefit analysis as mere “policy” overlays. A conscientious lawyer will
therefore guard against crossing the line, will ensure that he/she carefully stays
within the confines of “the law” and will know where the seam of true legal advice
must end. To do so, though, seems a bit disingenuous. The policy overlay that is
mandated by the COIN/stability operations doctrine requires consideration of vari-
ables concerning individual identity, of affiliation and role, and of sociopolitical con-
text. It does so because it has been proven to work in achieving the military goals
sought. A responsible lawyer must take these things into account when dispensing
meaningful legal advice. Once these elements are put into the balance, the rule re-
garding distinction becomes less an empirical exercise and more of an evaluative
process. The rule begins to transform into a standard. On the one hand is the re-
quirement to determine whether or not the person is in fact targetable under the
general DPH formula and then on the other is the issue of individually specific cri-
teria to determine whether or not the person is “reconcilable” or his targeting oth-
erwise has greater operational implications. Under this standard, the responsible
lawyer is permitted to have broader regard to the purposes and social values the
doctrine is propagating. Thus, in undertaking this exercise the role of policy be-
comes heavily implicated in the interpretation of the “rule.” This in turn shapes the
quality of legal advice that must be reached. The issue is equally attenuated when
dealing with the cognate principle of proportionality, which will now be addressed.
The Principle of Proportionality
The principle of proportionality as outlined in GPI is provided in the following rel-
evant recitation of Article 51(5)(b) under the heading “Protection of the civilian
population.” Article 51(5)(b) prohibits indiscriminate attacks, defined as “[a]n at-
tack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
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civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be ex-
cessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” The
principle is also contained in Article 57(2)(b), which is listed under the chapeau of
“Precautions in attack.”
The principle plainly introduces a standard whose factors concerning collateral
damage to property and incidental injury to civilians need to be balanced and
weighed against concrete and direct military advantage. The principle is one that
has not easily been reconciled. Professor Dinstein notes, for example, that there
has always been a fundamental disconnect between balancing military consider-
ations against civilian losses, as they are “dissimilar considerations.”115 Major
General Rogers poignantly notes that “[t]he rule is more easily stated than applied
in practice.”116
Numerous States parties to GPI have made declarations seeking to assure a
more expansive (and militarily advantageous) formalist architecture, including,
for example, declarations that the security of the attacking force may be a factor
that may be taken into account when balancing against “excessive” civilian loss and
that proportionality assessments should be undertaken with respect to the “attack
as a whole” and not individualized aspects of the attack.117 Dinstein notes the criti-
cism leveled at the principle as elaborated within GPI as permitting possibly too
great a subjective assessment by military commanders when undertaking the bal-
ancing requirement.118 As with the principle of distinction, a somewhat linear for-
mulation of assessment is undertaken. Hence civilians and civilian objects are
accorded a “value” and an exchange is processed along consequentialist lines,
whereby an attack may proceed on the basis that “anticipated concrete and direct
military advantage” outweighs, by even the smallest of margins, the expected
civilian loss.
Against this background the COIN Manual signals a self-conscious revision of
the application of the proportionality principle in accordance with its stated “para-
doxes” of counterinsurgency. Hence the manual states:
In conventional operations, proportionality is usually calculated in simple utilitarian
terms: civilian lives and property lost versus enemy destroyed and military advantage
gained. But in COIN operations, [military] advantage is best calculated not in terms of
how many insurgents are killed or detained, but rather which enemies are killed or
detained . . . . In COIN environments, the number of civilian lives lost and property
destroyed needs to be measured against how much harm the targeted insurgent could
do if allowed to escape.119
The commentary subsequently notes that the principles of discrimination and
proportionality may have an additional sociopolitical significance, stating that
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“[f]ires that cause unnecessary harm or death to noncombatants may create more
resistance and increase the insurgency’s appeal—especially if the populace per-
ceives a lack of discrimination in their use.”120
The formulation of military advantage and express reference to the political
and social implications of the use of force aren’t easily reconciled with classic reci-
tations of the parameters for assessing military advantage over civilian cost. The
COIN Manual commentary cited above focuses on the individual identity of the
insurgent, requires assessment of future potential harm such a person may inflict
(harm that the insurgent “could do”) and seeks to measure that against potential
civilian loss in terms of civilian reaction in relation to ongoing support for the in-
surgency and the associated risk of alienation. Such prescriptions plainly fit within
a model of “winning the population” under the COIN strategy by designing a
sociopsychological “barrier” between the population and insurgents, but do not
seem to square with the commentary offered on this principle arising out of the
negotiations that produced the Additional Protocols. Thus the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary to the negotiations notes that
the proportionality principle is to be viewed in the tactical context, not strategic,
commenting that the military advantage should be “substantial and close”121 and
that advantages that “would only appear in the long term should be disre-
garded.”122 Similarly, the ICRC Commentary rejects any notion of “political” ad-
vantage as coming within a formalistic reading of what the term “military advan-
tage” anticipates.123 This is not the type of calculation that the COIN Manual
mandates.
The ICRC Commentary naturally presumes that the balancing anticipates that
incidental loss of civilian life is to be weighed (and sacrificed) against military ad-
vantage and seeks to impose finite humanitarian limits on that equation. The
COIN orientation of this formula, however, ends up conflating minimization of
incidental civilian loss with military advantage. Ganesh Sitaraman concludes his
analysis of this phenomenon by stating that there is a unification of both humani-
tarian concerns and strategic self-interest.124 As a standard, the proportionality
principle more openly permits recourse to social purposes as an interpretative
tool. The ICRC Commentary reinforces this perspective by invoking the standard-
like obligations of “good faith”125 and “equity”126 as criteria that must apply to
decision making under the proportionality principle. Has, in fact, the COIN di-
rection to assess second- and third-order effects under the proportionality equa-
tion rendered the proportionality standard more “rule-like” with respect to
weighing the humanitarian side of the equation? Certainly, the trend in
international tribunal decision making has been to continually highlight humani-
tarian interests in LOAC127 and this author has argued elsewhere that the ICJ has
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proposed a formula for proportionality that does accord a perceptible weighting
for humanitarian requirements.128
A military decisionmaker is obliged under the COIN doctrine to assess the civil-
ian loss occasioned by an attack in broader operational and strategic terms. This is
not mandated under the terminology of Articles 51 and 57 of GPI but nonetheless
from the perspective of the military decisionmaker is a norm that now has authori-
tative effect. Akin to the status of a domestic law “regulation” the revised COIN
Manual has definitive de facto impact. A strict formalist approach to this issue may
disregard such doctrine as mere “policy.” As discussed previously, however, it
would be a foolish military lawyer who would adopt such a posture. The COIN
doctrine has an empirical rigidity that necessarily influences the manner in which
the principle of proportionality is applied. As Sarah Sewall emphasizes:
[I]n this context, killing the civilian is no longer just collateral damage. The harm
cannot be easily dismissed as unintended. Civilian casualties tangibly undermine the
counterinsurgent’s goals . . . . [T]he fact or perception of civilian deaths at the hands of
their nominal protectors can change popular attitudes from neutrality to anger and
active opposition.129
Indeed, so strategically significant is the issue of incidental injury in the COIN
context that the commanding general in Afghanistan recently issued a directive de-
tailing very limited and prescribed circumstances under which close air support
and indirect fire can be undertaken in residential areas.130 Such circumstances start
to resemble a “list” approach to when incidental injury may be occasioned. The
fact of incidental injury, however justified under formalist recitations of the law,
has proven to be a strategically intractable problem. Military policy has imposed a
high value on civilian loss that effectively weights the proportionality formula in fa-
vor of the humanitarian side, not because it is the “nice” thing to do, but rather as
Kilcullen notes, “our approach was based upon a clear-eyed appreciation of certain
basic facts”131 concerning the nature and quality of fighting an insurgency.
Rules/Standards and Legal Reasoning
The law of armed conflict sets, throughout its structure, the principles of military
necessity and humanitarian considerations in equipoise.132 The humanitarian
strategy of relying upon both rules and standards to advance humanitarian priori-
ties under this body of law is a considered, and a not-so-surprising, outcome. We
find hard empirically based rules to ensure a firm separation between combatants
and civilians under the principle of distinction and a more evaluative standard for
undertaking proportionality calculations where incidental injury is anticipated. As
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we have seen, under prevailing canons of interpretation, rules provide a requisite
level of certainty and objectivity, whereas employment of standards mandates that
“all perspectives”133 be taken into account, making “visible and accountable the in-
evitable weighing process that rules obscure.”134 The proportionality standard thus
requires that an express incorporation and open balancing of civilian lives be made
in the decision-making calculus.
As previously discussed, the COIN doctrine has inverted these truisms by ren-
dering the principle of distinction more standard-like and the principle of propor-
tionality more rule-like. It seems ironic that the purpose of this inversion is to
actually advance humanitarian considerations, albeit under a self-interested strat-
egy of ensuring military success. Should this be a problem? It would seem to be
problematic from a formalistic perspective. Focusing solely upon military (and po-
litical) effect under the law rather than upon traditional functional categories has
the potential to obscure the integrity of the “equipoise” established under the law.
The evolution of “effects-based targeting” methodology, for example, which simi-
larly applies a much more instrumentalist approach to targeting decisions, has
been resisted by international legal scholars because of its potential to undermine
the traditional legal distinctions between civilian and combatant.135 The fear is that
if military effectiveness becomes a viable benchmark for confidence then civilian
protection will be progressively eroded.
There remains a strong professional adherence to the existing formalist tenor of
the law of armed conflict, even when deviation from its terms can actually increase
the probability of humanitarian outcomes. Gabriella Blum has, for example, sur-
veyed a range of case studies where utilitarian reasoning under the law would
lessen humanitarian risk, though she has also demonstrated powerful resistance to
the employment of such reasoning.136 Her review of the “early warning proce-
dure” decision by the Israeli Supreme Court in the case of Adalah v. IDF137 is par-
ticularly instructive. The case concerned the use of Palestinian civilians by the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to provide early warning of an imminent arrest in
order to facilitate potential surrender and evacuation of innocent persons. Em-
pirical evidence adduced by Blum tends to support the conclusion that use of such
volunteers has reduced casualties of both military and civilians when undertaking
such arrests, though concomitantly the use of such procedures is prima facie con-
trary to a number of provisions of LOAC. The Israeli Supreme Court unanimously
rejected IDF use of this technique, holding that this procedure was contrary to the
law of armed conflict, reiterating “the IHL prohibition on using the civilian popu-
lation for the military needs of the occupying army, and also the obligation to dis-
tance innocent civilians from the zone of hostilities.”138 It appears that the
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pragmatic humanitarian outcomes that the IDF policy sought to optimize weren’t
significant enough to obviate the risk of forensic violation of LOAC principles.
Unlike the choices faced by the Israeli Supreme Court in the Adalah case, the
reasoning applied under the COIN/stability operations doctrine doesn’t constitute
a direct affront to the existing humanitarian principles underpinning the LOAC;
rather it demands a variegated reasoning process. Such reasoning can exist within
traditional categories by providing a narrower band of who may be targeted (dis-
tinction) and when incidental injury is permissible (proportionality) and may thus
meet with less resistance. These goals are certainly consistent with humanitarian
priorities but they demand a more policy/political-oriented interpretative ap-
proach in individual cases, and, of course, they serve specific military ends. If noth-
ing else it demonstrates yet again the indeterminacy of the law and the artificiality
of formalist legal reasoning. H.L.A. Hart himself acknowledged that principles,
policies and purposes can inform reasoning within the penumbral region of rules
and the more open context of standards. He remained adamant that such “law
making” occurred only at the “fringe”139 with respect to rules and was nonetheless
still subject to “indisputable” measures of correctness with respect to standards.140
This marginalization of principles, policies and purposes to inform legal reasoning
has been at the center of jurisprudential debate for many years. It was Hans
Morgenthau who advocated a more direct assimilation of policy and law over
sixty years ago. His functionalist advocacy required “precepts of international
law” to be interpreted in the light of “ethico-legal principles”141 with a strong refer-
ence to “social”142 context if law was to escape its formalistic orientation and be-
come more relevant to international discourse. In the COIN doctrine we see the
realization of this concept. Doctrine applies to reshape rules and standards alike,
such modification being consciously directed under specific means/ends rational-
ity. It remains to be seen whether this development is accepted for what it is, or
whether it will be reconciled and explained away within existing canons of interpre-
tation, no matter how artificial and unsatisfying that explanation. In representing
an affront to interpretative approaches to rule formalism, it may also be resisted
for what it presages. Conflating military effectiveness with humanitarian protec-
tion is surely sound but, as in the Adalah case, the acceptance of this proposition
strikes deep into judicial sensitivities and runs the perceived risk of opening the
door to accepting a deeply instrumentalist approach to the law that risks elevating
military effectiveness as an interpretative benchmark.
Alternatively, the combination of rules and standards methodologies under
COIN/stability operations doctrine can operate to better inform ethical judg-
ment. In his critique of the principle of LOAC’s concept of distinction, David
Kennedy queries whether the purpose of the classic rule is “ethical distinction” or
308
COIN and Stability Operations: A New Approach to Legal Interpretation
Vol 86.ps
C:\_WIP\_Blue Book\_Vol 86\_Ventura\Vol 86.vp
Monday, May 24, 2010 11:46:59 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
“instrumental calculation.”143 The same critique may, of course, apply to the
principle of proportionality. According to Kennedy, the combination of invoking
a formalist style of interpretation in conjunction with an underlying utilitarian
orientation allows for a “proceduralization” of bloodshed that permits the avoid-
ance of any real sense of personal responsibility.144 The new COIN/stability oper-
ations doctrine, which demands sociopolitical analysis in any targeting solution
under the law, meets these criticisms. However, it carries with it a particular cog-
nitive risk. Once individuals are assessed on criteria of “reconcilability” rather than
on the more formulaic DPH criteria, it animates both cognitive and emotional
processing of information. Thus, from an emotional perspective, whether a tar-
geting action is an instance of lawful engagement or “murder” has the potential
for initiating significant cognitive dissonance. It is an omnipresent feature in in-
dividual decisions under the law and the “firewall” between such concepts is ade-
quately maintained through a functional DPH category approach. The
requirement for individual assessment based upon socio-legal considerations,
even when a person comes within the DPH criteria, threatens to unravel this ethi-
cal “distance” that the existing law establishes.
In warfare, military lawyers effectively undertake the judicial decision-making
role. Military lawyers will provide a multitude of interpretations and advice to
commanders on what always seem to be cascading legal problems. This advice is al-
ways time sensitive and always undertaken in the shadow of the law. The COIN/
stability operations policy approach to questions of targeting imposes a definitive
high “value” on civilian life that is heavily weighted on achieving advantageous
militarily strategic outcomes. This policy can in fact be reconciled with existing
formulations of distinction and proportionality, but we should be aware of the way
this policy is guiding selection of legal canons of interpretation. The malleability of
interpretative devices, of turning rules into standards and vice versa, exposes the
apparent structural “certainties” of formalism and threatens incorporation of the
traditional risks of arbitrariness, subjectivity and inflexibility associated with the
rules/standards dichotomy in a compounded manner. It would be wrong to read
too much into this phenomenon, however. Indeterminacy is more of a feature of
the law than we might like to think. The realist movement and its “critical legal
studies” successors have long been dedicated to ascertaining the inchoate policy
preferences of judicial decision making. Here, ironically, the role of humanitarian
considerations has been “imposed” as an express preference in the interpretation
of the principles of distinction and proportionality. It is both an ethical distinction
and an instrumental calculation. It also speaks the language of legitimacy, which is
fast becoming the currency of the law of armed conflict but, as stated, is not
without its cognitive risks.
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Part III. Legal Plurality in COIN/Stability Operations
The COIN/stability operations manuals emphasize the critical need for interven-
ing forces to assume a particularized form of ethical orientation, one that displays
demonstrable compliance with the law and its underlying humanitarian ethos and
also accepts greater risk in achieving the military goals that have been set. Acting
with “rectitude” has become a key theme in establishing the necessary legitimacy to
underpin COIN/stability operations.145 The role of “soft power” has been high-
lighted as a fundamental tenet of success. In this regard Kilcullen notes, “America’s
international reputation, moral authority, diplomatic weight, persuasive ability,
cultural attractiveness, and strategic credibility—its ‘soft power’—is not some op-
tional adjunct to military strength. Rather, it is a critical enabler for a permissive
operating environment.”146 In the working environment of COIN/stability opera-
tions this throws up numerous legal conundrums. The perennial question of the
interplay between LOAC and human rights law within a conflict zone is one of
these. Another is the choice between invocation of the full conventional apparatus
of the law of armed conflict when dealing with, for example, “irreconcilables,” as
against resort to law enforcement measures and associated criminal justice proce-
dures to be undertaken primarily by domestic national forces.
The dilemmas facing the legal advisor in a “post-conflict” conflict are multifac-
eted and perhaps more challenging than in a straightforward conventional war
context. At what point, for example, does the LOAC framework give way to human
rights norms and the application of domestic criminal law standards? Is it a sliding
scale? Are there particular categories of actor or context where the break is more
abrupt? COIN and stability operations doctrine makes it plain that counterintuitive
principles are critical to success, though conventional LOAC interpretative meth-
odologies still have their place. The challenge is discerning when one is to be pre-
ferred over the other. In all post-conflict societies where intervening military forces
are operating, there is a strong will for emerging national institutions to assert their
understandable desire for sovereign independence. Concomitantly, a stated coun-
terinsurgency “paradox” principle is “[t]he host nation doing something tolerably
is normally better than us doing it well.”147 Establishing the legitimacy of domestic
institutions is a key factor in COIN/stability operations doctrine, though what if the
probable cost of forbearance is the loss of life in one’s own forces? Moreover, what if
complying with civil law processes (warrant-based arrests, for example) will likely re-
sult in greater casualties for your forces though resort to available LOAC avenues of
action to “kill-capture,” which minimize that risk, are equally available? Which
legal option is the right one to take? Post-conflict societies are often in a mixed state
of war and peace, and the reality of complying with civil law enforcement measures
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is not like that in Western democratic societies. When is the assumption of greater
risk, which COIN/stability operations doctrine mandates, not appropriate, espe-
cially when other legal regimes that mitigate that risk (though not without some
cost to legitimacy) are equally applicable and equally valid?
The Interaction of LOAC and International Human Rights Law in
COIN/Stability Operations
The interaction of the law of armed conflict and international HR law, which is so
much a staple of contemporary mainstream academic debate, has its operation-
alization in the very contexts that COIN and stability operations doctrine anticipates.
This requires practical disentangling on the ground. While the framework estab-
lished by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion148 for reconciling these
questions makes plain that LOAC (referred to by the Court as international hu-
manitarian law (IHL)) and HR law can both apply during a time of armed conflict,
the maxim of lex specialis will determine the content of prevailing obligation. In
that instance, dealing with the right to life and the prohibition of arbitrary depriva-
tion, in issuing its advisory opinion the Court found that IHL represented the lex
specialis.149 The ICJ’s subsequent pronouncement in the 2004 Wall advisory opin-
ion150 provided less than exacting guidance when determining that “some rights
may be exclusively matters of IHL; others may be exclusively matters of human
rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law.”151
The question of resolution between these two bodies of international law may,
however, be more prosaically tackled. Rather than a mighty clash of strategic prin-
ciple where one body of law in toto trumps the other, there appears to be a more
nuanced assimilation that is occurring in practice. For certain coalition partners ei-
ther policy or domestic legal directives will directly or indirectly apply human
rights norms to their operational activities. They are rarely formally expressed at
the ground level as being one or the other and to the soldier on the ground the dis-
tinction is of little import. Hence, with respect to detention operations, which are
plainly a significant component of COIN operations, it is evident that the influence
of domestic law, such as the UK Human Rights Act (which in turn incorporates the
European Convention on Human Rights) will continue to have application for ac-
tivities occurring during armed conflict. As the Al-Skeini case152 has established,
these norms can have decisive legal application in a conflict so as to compel obser-
vance by particular forces with respect to particular fact circumstances.153 While
courts will invariably rely upon a careful recitation of facts and circumstances
when formulating such standards, government and military policy will usually
provide for a broader degree of “margin” to ensure lawful and socially legitimate/
acceptable behavior. Hence the impact of this UK legislative authority (as judicially
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interpreted) has an assimilative effect in terms of standard operating procedures
(SOPs) written for such operations, ones that other coalition partners are required
to respect and observe when engaging in combined operations. Whether the guid-
ance derives from LOAC or HR law, from domestic or international law, the im-
pact upon operations on the ground and the indirect policy do influence behavior
and act as socializing agents between forces acting in concert. Thus in the event of
COIN operations within Iraq or Afghanistan, should non-UK forces wish to utilize
UK detention facilities there is a requirement for compliance with UK legal and
policy preferences. Given the specificity of such obligations the question of lex
specialis becomes, in effect, one of HR obligations providing definitive guidance.
The Orientation of Legal Advice
Grappling with the reality of legal plurality within an operational context, especially
when looking at both the horizontal and vertical planes of interaction in a COIN
environment, provides unique challenges. Lawyers are used to compartmentalizing
legal concepts and applying time-tested forensic skills and “disciplined, intuitive”154
legal reasoning to the resolution of problems. The law of armed conflict provides a
particularized intellectual structure. Counterinsurgency inverts most of the truisms
associated with such formalist thinking. When defeat was staring the coalition in
the eyes in Iraq in 2007, a radical new strategy was developed that recognized the
need for a more careful and judicious application of force (“We cannot kill our way
out of this endeavor”). Classic legal prescriptions under LOAC don’t quite match
the objectives being sought, or at least don’t synchronize with the new “means” as
easily, except in the pressing case of targeting “irreconcilables.”
The legal advisors in both Iraq and Afghanistan over the past few years have
been dealing with the classic “three-block war” concept.155 In these instances, the
forces were engaged in antiterrorism, as well as counterinsurgency, while simulta-
neously trying to build capacity and ensuring compliance with the multifaceted
rule of law foundation that COIN/stability operations doctrine demands.156 Legal
problems in these contexts are not so easily compartmentalized; these issues are
too deeply interconnected. Choices need to be made holistically with the net result
possibly being the loss of one’s own soldiers through compliance with what ap-
pears to be abstract and aberrant policy. It is clear, though, that the new doctrine
reflected in the COIN/stability operations is actually working in the strategic sense.
Doctrine plays a decisive role in military decision making and there is evidence
that operational planning teams have socialized the new directions mandated in
effectively fighting this postmodern warfare. As previously mentioned, there is not
a lot of evidence that the legal community has been as ready to internalize these
fundamental changes. Lawyers have a tendency to interpret factual problems in
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accordance with extant legal prescriptions and prevailing models, and seek to
manipulate facts to ensure a sense of legal integrity when dispensing advice. Per-
haps the dissociative mechanism of distinguishing between law and policy that
lawyers readily employ to temper challenges to formalist orthodoxy in the area of
operational law will again prevail. Perhaps the law of armed conflict will retain its
perceived ideational integrity, though stepping back from this, there is something
unsettling in trying to conform postmodern approaches into a legal framework
that predominantly dates back to the post–World War Two era (in fact, back to the
nineteenth century). It seems to set the stage for legal marginalization. The better
accommodation may be one that retains the substance of the law but is more open
to a modified interpretative valence.
Part IV. Conclusion
The body of the modern law of armed conflict is “the result of an equitable balance
between the necessities of war and humanitarian requirements.”157 Through the
mechanism of hard-line empirical rules, as well as flexible evaluative standards,
this fundamental military/humanitarian balance is in perpetual creative tension.
The adoption of a shared vocabulary within the law has allowed an intersection of
dialogue between military professionals and humanitarian advocates that has, in
fact, empowered both camps. It is of no small measure, for example, that the prin-
ciple of proportionality may be celebrated as a desirable union of both military
economy and humanitarian restraint. The principle provides a moral and political
convergence: only “direct and concrete military advantage” and non-“excessive”
civilian loss are permitted. Yet, the simple mechanics and elegant mathematical
confidence of the proportionality principle seem to permit avoidance of broader
ethical questions. As David Kennedy has observed, mechanically complying with
the law can allow the avoidance of “ethical jeopardy” and the minimization of per-
sonal responsibility.158 The recognition of the specifics of individual identity and
anticipating the second- and third-order effects of a “proportionate attack” are not
matters that have occupied much legal time in any planning analysis, and yet, as we
have seen in COIN, they can have enormous strategic policy significance.
The postmodern era of warfare challenges old legal orthodoxies. Concepts such
as avoiding incidental civilian injury in terms that far exceed legal limits and re-
quiring greater precision in targeting than merely verifying the relevant civilian/
combatant categories of privilege (and its loss) represent a powerful transformative
approach to conducting operations. The COIN/stability operations doctrine predi-
cates are largely counterintuitive and at odds with traditional approaches to legal in-
terpretation. When, for example, has “emotional intelligence,” as General Kiszely
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identifies,159 ever been relevant to disciplined legal analysis? It is evident that the
weight of operational doctrine and increasing assimilation of human rights norms
into multi-splintered SOPs require a reconsideration of prevailing approaches to
interpretative valence. Perhaps issues such as human rights norms applying to op-
erations and the conflation of military advantage with preserving civilian lives un-
der age-old formulas may be rationalized and distinguished as “mere” policy.
Perhaps legal advisors can continue to insist on a “Hartian” template for interpre-
tative rectitude and can answer all the relevant constituencies “out there” with a ro-
bust assertion that it “is the law” that justifies and rationalizes actions, and as
lawyers we must be vigilant to remain strictly within its boundaries. Or perhaps
not. Could it be that policy has always infiltrated legal reasoning in ways that are
not openly acknowledged? Perhaps the American realists of the interwar period160
did have it right and legal analysis can be much more flexible and accommodating
of policy inputs than what we might want to admit and, moreover, may do so with-
out impugning the integrity of the law. Perhaps the law of armed conflict still re-
tains all we need to ensure military success, we just need to be mindful of what we
mean by such success and be conscious of how we can get there. Either way, a real
revolution in military affairs is under way and it does implicate the law in funda-
mental ways. The coming storm offers a rare opportunity to recalibrate the inter-
pretative valence of the law in a spirit of self-awareness made all the more ironic by
the fact that it is operational pragmatism that has sparked this phenomenon.
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perform very different missions simultaneously. See Charles C. Krulak, The Strategic Corporal:
Leadership in the Three Block War, MARINES MAGAZINE, Jan. 1999, at 3, available at http://
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm.
156. KILCULLEN, supra note 7, at 152 (“prosecuting the campaign demands an agile mixing of
counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, border security, nation-building, and peace enforcement
operations”).
157. ICRC Commentary, supra note 101, para. 2206, at 683.
158. KENNEDY, supra note 84, at 169.
159. Kiszely, supra note 1, at 184.
160. Referring generally to 1918–39, the period between the end of World War One and the
beginning of World War Two.
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